COMMENT
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: A CASE
AGAINST MAKING FEDERAL CASES
I. INTRODucTION

Nearly two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton, in defense of a
proposed constitutional provision for the establishment of lower federal courts, wrote that the "possibility of particular mischiefs" which
may be wrought by their creation should not be viewed as a "solid
objection" to a system designed "to avoid general mischiefs." Such was
Hamilton's conclusion to his paper outlining the "proper extent" and
"proper objects" of federal jurisdiction.'
One "particular mischief' unforeseen by Hamilton is the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction to encompass prosecutions rightly
within the purview of the states.2 This expansion, and the concomitant explosion in the number of federal criminal prosecutions, has
been decried by legal scholars during the past four decades. 3 The

I

THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534, 541 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton's
examples of the "proper objects" of federal jurisdiction are embodied in article III, § 2 of the
Constitution. Hamilton noted that the states, by virtue of their union, were prohibited from
doing certain things, such as imposing duties on imports and printing currency, because these
activities would be detrimental to the Union:
No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded,
without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions
of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the state laws, or an
authority in the federal courts, to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of union.
Id. at 535.
Though an ardent advocate of a strong federal government, Hamilton's discussion of the
role of federal courts indicates he believed that these tribunals were necessary for the enforcement of matters which necessarily were delegated by the states to the federal government in
order to preserve the Union.
See H. FRIENDLY, The Minimum Model Today, in FEDERAL JURIsDICrION: A GENEL
VIEW (1973); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdictionand Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoas. 64 (1948).
3 See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 2. Although 25 years elapsed
between the publication of these works, both Professor Schwartz and Judge Friendly recommended restraint by federal prosecutors in determining what types of offenses merit federal
attention. Professor Schwartz urged that "the proper employment of the federal court in the
criminal field requires the recognition . . . by United States attorneys to turn over to state
authorities persons who, by the same conduct, violate local laws as well as national laws
intended to be auxiliary to local enforcement." Schwartz, supra note 2, at 66.
Judge Friendly questioned whether federal criminal jurisdiction whose "primary basis" is
the "use of facilities crossing state lines" is an unreasonable expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 56. He asserted that: "The question whether federal
criminal prosecutions have not greatly outreached any true federal interest. . .deserves the most
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passage during this time of more federal statutes4 which federal prosecutors use to attack local crimes, notably crimes of political corruption, promises that federal prosecutions of cases with little or no
federal interest will increase.
This Comment recommends a radical approach designed to limit
federal criminal prosecutions to those which have a substantial federal
interest by eliminating one important incentive to federal prosecution:
the advantage which some federal procedural and substantive rules of
law offer to prosecutors in comparison to the rules applied in the
courts of many states, including New Jersey. 5 It is therefore recommended that the application of the procedural and substantive rules of
a state be applied to criminal prosecutions brought in federal courts
within that state. This would eliminate the prosecutor's incentive to
bring essentially state cases in federal courts, and have the effect of
returning such prosecutions to their proper forum.6 The proposed
" Id. at 58. "It is thus fair to say that today '[t]here is practically no
serious examination ..
offense within the purview of local law that does not become a federal crime if some distinctive
federal involvement happens to be present'-and the involvement may be exceedingly thin." Id.
at 57 (quoting Abrams, Consultant's Report on jurisdiction:Chapter 2, in I WORKING PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 36 (1970)).
4 See, e.g., Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982) (making interstate travel in furtherance of
crime a federal felony); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1963 (1982) (establishing additional penal provisions and more severe punishments for
financial infiltration, through pattern of racketeering activity, of legitimate businesses which
affect interstate commerce).
5 CompareState v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (prohibiting warrantless seizure
by state authorities of individual's telephone toll records) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) (individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers he dials) and
State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (granting standing to challenge search and
seizure to those with possessory interest in items seized) with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83 (1980) (standing to challenge search limited to those with legitimate expectation of privacy in
area searched, regardless of ownership of items seized). Compare N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a)(18)
(providing pretrial discovery by defendant of signed and unsigned statements of government
witnesses or potential witnesses) with 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1982) (prohibiting criminal defendant
from obtaining statements or reports of government witnesses until witness has testified on direct
examination at trial). See generally infra note 10.
6 The United States Department of Justice has a policy, established in 1959, which provides
that once a state has prosecuted criminal activity, the federal government will refrain from a
prosecution based on the same core of facts or conduct unless there is a substantial federal interest
in the prosecution. This is known as the "Petite" policy, after the Supreme Court per curiam
decision recognizing the policy. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). Observing that
the concept of dual sovereignty permits both state and federal prosecution of the same criminal
conduct without violation of the double jeopardy clause, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, urged the Court to adopt the policy. Id. at 533.
The Justice Department does not always follow its "Petite" policy. See In re Washington,
544 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding denial of government's post-conviction motion to
dismiss indictment, the subject of which had been source of earlier state convictions, for
government's bad faith in intentionally violating its own policy), vacated sub nom. Rinaldi v.
United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
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system would operate as the criminal counterpart to the mandate of
the United States Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.7 In
federal prosecutions which have only a tenuous connection to federal
law violations, state law would apply.8 This would be the case when
the elements of a state crime more aptly describe the alleged criminal
conduct than do the elements of any federal crime. When the alleged
offense is clearly federal, however, federal law would apply. 9
Several reasons exist to support this concept. One is the inherent unfairness to a defendant who loses the increased protections
his state constitution may afford when he is brought into federal
court. In recent years, the highest courts of several states, including
New Jersey, have relied on their state constitutions in granting
greater individual protections, 10 particularly in the area of criminal
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie decision minimized "forum shopping" by civil litigants by
requiring that state law be applied to civil actions brought in federal court through diversity
jurisdiction. The Court recognized the inherent unfairness of permitting the outcome of a case to
be decided by the forum in which it is heard as being a denial of equal protection. In addition to
diversity cases, there are other instances when federal courts look to state law to supply the rule
of decision. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (privilege governed by principles of common law a
interpreted by federal courts in light of reason and experience; in civil proceedings privileges
shall be determined according to state law). In Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.
1979), the Third Circuit considered the Pennsylvania newspaper reporter's Shield Law, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West Supp. 1983-1984), in determining that reporters have the
privilege not to reveal their sources in a civil case brought under federal statutes. Cf. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (first amendment does not permit newspaper reporter to assert
privilege before grand jury investigating crime).
8 Unlike the Erie Doctrine, this approach would require a statutory enactment. Cf. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982) (state criminal law applicable to crimes committed on
federally-owned reservations within state). The Erie Doctrine, judicially adopted, applies to
cases clearly arising under state law which are in federal court solely because of diversity
jurisdiction.
9 One possible method of implementing this proposal could be for the defendant to challenge the federal jurisdiction in a pretrial motion by making a prima Jacie showing that the
elements of the allegation against him more closely fit the elements of a state crime. The
prosecutor would then have the burden of showing the substantial federal interest which would
permit federal law to control. If the prosecutor failed to make such a showing, it could be of
substantial advantage to the defendant because he therefore could prevent the escalation of a
misdemeanor into a more substantial federal offense. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d
406 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant convicted of federal felony of mail fraud for filing false campaign
report with state election committee, an offense which was misdemeanor under state law);
United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976) (federal Mail Fraud Act prosecution of
city plumbing inspector who accepted five-dollar gratuities from contractor; activity which was
misdemeanor under city ordinance); see infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
Another benefit of this proposal might be dismissal of the case from federal court, without
prejudice, when there has been no showing that state or county prosecutors are unwilling or
unable to prosecute the case, and their authority has been usurped by federal prosecutors.
10 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977); Wefing, Search and Seizure-New Jersey Supreme Court v. United States
Supreme Court, 7 SErON HALL L. REv. 771 (1976); see also Ziegler, ConstitutionalRights of the
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law.' At the same time, the Burger Court has contracted or even
refused to recognize these rights. A criminal defendant should not be
stripped of them, however, simply because he finds himself in federal
rather than state court. The disparity in treatment of defendants in
the two jurisdictions holds the potentiality for "forum shopping" by
state and federal prosecutors working together, and is likely to affect
2
the treatment of the defendant at both trial and sentencing. '
Further, the importance of a state court's decision to grant a
particular right wanes when a federal prosecutor may simply ignore
it.' 3 For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in reliance on the

state constitution, 4 recently held that a search warrant is required
before law enforcement officials may seize an individual's toll records
from the telephone company.1 5 The federal courts, on the other hand,

Accused-Developing Dichotomy Between Federaland State Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 241 (1977).
These articles trace Supreme Court rulings in the area of criminal law through the Warren and
Burger Courts and note the reliance which state courts place on state constitutions to expand
individual rights. See generally supra note 5.
1 See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 358, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring);
Brennan, supra note 10; Wefing, supra note 10; supra notes 5 & 10.
12 Compare State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (establishing "knowing
waiver- test, i.e., one who consents to search must understand he had right to refuse search) with
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (establishing "totality of circumstances" test,
i.e., consenter need not realize he had right to refuse search if circumstances indicate consent
freely given). Compare State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 917 (La. 1976) (granting standing to
challenge search to anyone aggrieved by it) with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)
(standing to challenge search limited to those with legitimate expectation of privacy in area
searched, regardless of ownership of items seized). Compare People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 2d 101,
113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976) and State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492
P.2d 657 (1971) and Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (Pa. 1975) (statements made by
defendant in absence of Miranda warnings may not be used to impeach defendant's credibility if
he takes witness stand at trial) with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (statement
inadmissible as direct evidence under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be used to
impeach defendant's credibility at trial).
Justice Brennan has written approvingly of the increasing use of state constitutions as
"guardians of our liberties," and believes it is a "highly significant development for our constitutional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism." Brennan, supra note 10, at 491-95.
'3 See cases cited supra notes 5 & 12; infra text accompanying notes 116-36.
'4 Article 1, § 7 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be
seized.
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Although the words are virtually identical to the fourth amendment, the state supreme
court has interpreted them to give broader rights to defendants. See, e.g., cases cited supra note
5.
is State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
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do not require the protection of a warrant; federal investigators may
seize these records at will, without having made a showing of probable cause to an independent magistrate.' 6 The individual is protected
from state intrusion into his privacy by the state constitution, but this
probably matters little to him when a federal investigatory agency
may rummage at will through his personal business. When state and
federal prosecutors work together, this state-granted protection has
even less meaning, because what the state authorities cannot obtain
without a proper showing of probable cause, the federal agency can.
Similarly, when state officials seize evidence in a manner which the
state court has held to be illegal under the state's constitution, the state
officials may simply turn it over to the federal prosecutors, who may
use it with impunity.17 Application of a state's procedural and substantive rules of law, acting as a disincentive to federal prosecutions of
what are really state crimes, would also free an already overburdened
federal docket 8 for litigants in that forum with a substantial federal
claim. Moreover, it would free federal prosecutors to investigate
crimes which have a substantial federal interest, and truly require the
resources of the federal government. 9
Federal prosecution of cases with only a tenuous or contrived
connection to federal law violations is a "particular mischief" anticipated by neither the Framers nor the Congresses which passed some of
the federal statutes now used to usurp the authority of state prosecuSmith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
See Ziegler, supra note 10. Judge Ziegler calls this phenomenon the "Copper Platter
Doctrine." This is a reversal of the Silver Platter Doctrine, which developed before the exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states. Under the Silver Platter Doctrine, federal officers
who had illegally seized evidence which was excluded from federal court would turn it over "on
a silver platter" to state officials for state prosecutions. The Supreme Court ended this practice in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Judge Ziegler points out that now that many states
afford their citizens greater rights under state constitutions, state officials have begun turning
over evidence to federal prosecutors which state but not federal law would hold was illegally
seized. See, e.g., United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1968); infra notes 114-36 and
accompanying text.
IS The federal civil caseload has increased each year since 1960. The number of filings
increased by 17.8% during the one-year period ending March 31, 1983, compared to the
previous year, for a total of 233,065. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 7 (1983). The number of criminal cases
filed in the same period was 34,778, an increase of 8.9% over the previous one-year period. Id.
at 13.
19 Professor Schwartz suggested five criteria to determine when federal action is justified: (1)
when states are unwilling or unable to act; (2) when the federal jurisdictional aspect of the crime
is "an important ingredient of its success"; (3) when a substantial federal interest is protected by
use of federal authority; (4) when a criminal operation extends into more than one state; and (5)
when it would be more efficient for federal prosecution of a complex case "investigated and
developed on the theory of federal prosecution." Schwartz, supra note 2, at 73.
16
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tors. Staunch Federalists such as Hamilton might have endorsed the
breadth now given to the first clause of article 11120 of the Constitution, which grants federal jurisdiction "to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United
States."' 21 Many of the Framers would be astounded, however, to see
that this clause now encompasses the prosecution in federal court of a
small-town politician accused of what is essentially bribery-a crime
adequately prohibited by state criminal codes.2 2 They would be bemused by the sentencing to federal prison of a local political operative
whose conviction on mail fraud charges arose from the fraudulent
procurement of absentee ballots for a municipal school board election.2 3 They might wonder what would have become of the federal
prosecution if the ballots had been hand delivered, rather than
mailed, to the election board. They might also wonder at the fairness
10 The Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, made federal jurisdiction "almost coextensive with
the constitutional authorization." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 36-37 (2d ed. 1973). It was repealed
when the Jeffersonians came to power the following year. Id. (referring to Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2
Stat. 132).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 623-27 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an example of a federal law enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause which resulted in proscribing conduct with miniscule effects on interstate
commerce. Enforcement of that Act resulted in cases such as Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964) (refusal to serve Blacks in public accomodations affects interstate commerce and is
violative of Title II of Civil Rights Act), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (same). Neither the correctness of the results of these decisions nor the authority
of Congress to enact legislation pursuant to its commerce power is questioned here. But see Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 280-86 (Douglas, J., concurring) (decision based on 14th
amendment rather than commerce clause would have "more settling effect" and make unnecessary litigation over whether inn or restaurant is within "commerce" definitions of Act); Letter
from Gerald Gunther to the Department of Justice (June 5, 1963), excerpts reprinted in C.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (10th ed. 1980) (urging enactment of Civil Rights Act on basis of 14th amendment and asserting use of commerce clause as
Act's basis is "strained").
The Court's somewhat strained analyses of the effect on interstate commerce resulting from
an inn and a family restaurant's refusal to serve Blacks in the Heart of Atlanta and McClung
cases illustrate how jurisdiction based on the commerce clause can be stretched until it sometimes
appears to be a legal fiction. In these cases, however, the Court was using federal authority to
protect a substantial federal interest-equality of all people at a time when many states were
adamantly refusing to recognize the rights of minorities. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 73.
At issue here is the application of legislation, properly enacted pursuant to the commerce
clause, to cases where the effect on interstate commerce is so attenuated as to be ephemeral, no
national interest is furthered by the prosecution, and state law will suffice to prosecute the
alleged activity.
23 See United States v. Cherubini, No. 82-5780 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 1982), afJ'd, slip op. (3d Cir.
July 21, 1983), cert. denied, No. 83-844 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984).
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of exposing the defendant to a sentence under the federal statute when
24
the actual state crime carries a much lighter penalty.
Against this background, it is clear that the integrity of state
constitutions and their interpretation by state courts, the inherent
unfairness to criminal defendants prosecuted for essentially state-prohibited behavior, and the overburdened and ever-burgeoning federal
court docket, 25 require the remedy which would be afforded by applying a state's procedural and substantive rules of law in the federal
courts within that state's district. This Comment will discuss the
history of the two federal statutes which are among the more popular
vehicles used by federal prosecutors to stretch their jurisdiction, the
Mail Fraud Act 26 and the Hobbs Act. 2 7 Cases brought under these
statutes will be used to illustrate the unfairness to defendants and the
perversion of legislative intent which results when they are used to
28
prosecute state crimes.
II. THE MAIL FRAUD ACT

The legislative history of the Mail Fraud Act (18 U.S.C. § 1341) is
scant, yet indicates that the statute was directed at fraudulent conduct
24 See id.; see also United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976). In Curry, federal prosecution was based on the fact
that the defendant used the United States mails to submit a false campaign contribution report to
the state election committee-a misdemeanor under state law. In McNeive, the federal prosecution was based on the fact that a contractor who gave the defendant-plumbing inspector fivedollar gratuities had mailed them to the defendant. McNeive's conduct was at most a violation of
a city ordinance.
25 Former Federal District Court Judge for the District of New Jersey H. Curtis Meanor
recently asserted that "80 per cent, at least, of the criminal cases that come into the federal
courts, could just as easily be handled in the state courts. For example, I can't think of a mail
fraud case that could not be brought instead under state laws." The Sunday Star Ledger, Feb.
27, 1983, at 1, col. 5. The former federal judge believes New Jersey's federal court system is "in
danger of collapsing from its own weight of cases as a result of matters which don't belong in
these courts...." Id. at col. 3.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982).
27 Id. § 1951. By no means are these the only statutes abused by federal prosecutors. The

Travel Act, id. § 1952, is another favored tool. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
28 The Mail Fraud Act and the Hobbs Act represent two types of federal penal statutes, those
which are designed to protect local interests from abuse through use of the facilities of interstate
commerce, and those designed to protect the federal interest in interstate commerce itself,
respectively. The former type must be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943) ("where Congress is creating offenses which duplicate or build upon
state law, courts should be reluctant to expand the defined offenses beyond the clear requirements of the terms of the statute"). An argument could be made that, with regard to the latter
type of statute, there is no reason not to read them as broadly as the commerce clause permits.
What is permissible, however, may not necessarily be in line with congressional intent in
enacting these statutes.
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where the mails were indispensable vehicles for carrying out the
fraud. 29 The predecessor to section 1341 was section 301 of the Act of
June 8, 1872. Its sponsor 30 stated that it was designed to "prevent the
frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and
fleecing the innocent people in the country," and sought to proscribe
the mailing of circulars from bogus offices in the cities offering getrich-quick schemes to those who were unable to check whether the
offices existed. 3' These schemes to defraud which the Congress sought
to prevent could operate only because of the schemers' use of the
mails. 32 Early cases brought under the statute involved prosecutions

Section 1341, the Mail Fraud Act, reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin,
obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at
the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
30 Rep. John Farnsworth (R. Ill.).
31 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
32 Rep. Farnsworth illustrated the type of conduct targeted by his bill:
I have here . . . a large number of specimen circulars and letters . . . sent from
various bogus offices in the large cities ... . Some of them are schemes for selling
counterfeit money. They send out genuine specimens of fractional currency, and say
to their correspondents, "We can sell you so much of this money for so much." . . .
[T]hev may, perhaps, send a genuine twenty-five or fifty cent currency note. The
person receiving the circular may not be particularly ignorant, but being somewhat
greed', he shows it to some banker or broker, who, of course, pronounces it to be
good money. Thereupon, the countryman immediately sends to the address of the
agent, in New York, for instance, . . . an order. . . . A box or package is sent to him,
...which . . . is found to contain waste paper, sawdust, or maybe bogus money....
Thus all through the country thousands of innocent and unsophisticated people,
knowing nothing about the ways of these city thieves and robbers, are continually
fleeced and robbed, and the mails are made use of for the purpose of aiding them in
their nefarious designs.
Id.; see also Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-CorruptionProsecutions
Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 568-69 (1980). The author
suggests that federal prosecutors abuse the legislators' purpose in enacting § 1351 by applying it
in instances wherein the victims are "defrauded" of intangibles, such as good government, rather
than property. Id. An amendment to § 301, in 1899, added specific prohibitions against counterfeiting schemes prevalent at the time. The 1909 amendment added a prohibition against "obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §
21
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consistent with Congress' intent to punish swindlers who used the
33
mails to dupe others.
A century later, the Supreme Court observed in United States v.
Maze 34 that the Mail Fraud Act could only encompass mailings that
are "sufficiently closely related" to a fraudulent scheme. 35 The Court
also has noted that the mail fraud statute does not reach all frauds,
"but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part
of the execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with
' 36
by appropriate state law."
Despite these mandates and congressional intent, section 1341
has been used to prosecute cases in which the "rapscallion" did not
aim to fleece anyone in particular out of anything in particular. An
expansive view of what could be the object of a fraudulent scheme
first arose, for example, in United States v. States. 37 The prosecution
employed a theory of "intangible rights," neither pecuniary nor proprietary, of which a victim may be defrauded, such as the right to
good government. 38 The defendants in States, who were candidates
running for local party committee seats, used fictitious names to
obtain fraudulent voter registrations, and then used these registrations
to obtain absentee ballots. 39 They were foiled when an alert postal
worker, attempting to deliver the absentee ballots, realized that the
"voters" to whom they were being sent did not exist. 40 The power of
the federal government was brought to bear on the perpetrators.
Election fraud, however, can be perpetrated without using the mails,
and state law prohibits such conduct. 41 The election at issue in States
215, 35 Stat. 1130. It was enacted without debate or comment. See Comment, supra, at 566-78
for a thorough review of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
33 For example, in Durland v. United States, 361 U.S. 306 (1896), an early mail fraud case,
the Court upheld the convictions under the statute of a defendant who had mailed circulars
soliciting buyers for bonds. The bonds did not mature as promised in the circulars, and the
defendant knew they would not. He "was trying to entrap the unwary, and to secure money
from them on the faith of a scheme glittering and attractive in form, yet unreal and deceptive in
fact, and known to him to be such." Id. at 312.
34 414 U.S. 395, 399-405 (1974).
35 Id. at 399.
36 Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944).
37 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
3 Id. at 764. One commentator criticized this theory as being unsupported by the statute's
legislative history and the meaning of fraud in the 19th century, when the statute was first
enacted, concluding that its use "against politically corrupt politicians thus remains contrary to
Congress's [sic] original intent." Comment, supra note 32, at 587.
3' States, 488 F.2d at 763-64.
40

Id.

Indeed, Congress has recognized that it may intrude in election matters only when a
federal election is involved. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Fourth
Circuit has permitted an expansion of prosecution of local election fraud under this statute when
41
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was for seats on local party committees-as "local" an election as
there might be. Nevertheless, a coterie of federal employees devoted
its time to investigating and prosecuting the election fraud.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the States convictions, but at least one
judge did so reluctantly, stating:
I cannot believe that it was the original intent of Congress that the
Federal Government should take over the prosecution of every state
crime involving fraud just because the mails have been used in
furtherance of that crime. The facts in this case show that this
election fraud was purely a state matter. It should have been
prosecuted in state court. The Assistant United States Attorney
conceded in oral argument that the case was not the type of mail
fraud case covered by written instructions contained in the United
States Attorneys' manual. . . . [H]e relieved the state of its duty to
police the violation of its local election laws and helped create a
precedent which will encourage 42the same sort of unwarranted
federal preemption in the future.
The Eighth Circuit demonstrated its reluctance to let section
1341 encroach so far into state territory two years after States by
reversing the conviction in United States v. McNeive. 43 McNeive, the
chief plumbing inspector for the City of St. Louis, was prosecuted
under section 1341 because he had accepted five-dollar gratuities from
a plumbing contractor each time he issued a permit to the contractor. 44 McNeive's acceptance of the tips was a violation of an unwritten
departmental policy and a city ordinance. 45 There was no indication,
however, that McNeive had extended any special favors to the contractor. 4 The government contended that his activity had deprived
47
the people of St. Louis of the intangible right to his honest services.
That was the fraud element. The United States Attorney who brought
the case apparently believed that the fact that the contractor had
mailed the gratuities to McNeive along with his application for permits constituted the second element of section 1341 .48
the local candidates are on the same ballot as candidates for federal office. United States v.
Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1187 (1983).
42 States, 488 F.2d at 767 (Ross, J., concurring).
13 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1246.
15 Id.; ST. Louis, Mo., REv. COOE § 41.040 (1960 & Supp. 1964) (recodified as § 4.02.010
(1980)). This section prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of any gift of money by city officials
for their services. McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1246 n.1.
" McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1246.
17 Id. at 1247.
41 The court did not discuss that element, having found that McNeive's acceptance of the
gratuities had worked no fraud. Id.
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In reversing McNeive's conviction, the Eighth Circuit stated:
"Historically, § 1341 provides no foundation for the pervasive view
the Government now accords it."-49 Basing its view on the language
and underlying policy of section 1341, the court concluded that
McNeive's conduct "was beyond the pale of that statute," 50 and
refused to accept "that Congress, by enacting the mail fraud statute,
contemplated that a situation similar to McNeive's would be classified
as a scheme to defraud." 5 1 Had McNeive been prosecuted under the
city ordinance, his conviction probably would have been valid. The
cost of McNeive's prosecution would have been borne by the people of
St. Louis-those people who were "defrauded" by McNeive's conduct,
if indeed anyone was cheated 52-and federal dollars and energy
would have been conserved for the prosecution of true federal felons.
Another example of federal intrusion into state matters occurred
in United States v. Curry.53 Curry involved the conviction under
section 1341 of the head of a political action committee who had filed
a false campaign contribution report to the Louisiana state election
committee. 54 The Fifth Circuit reversed Curry's conviction on three
counts of mail fraud because the trial court had failed to include in its
charge to the jury that good faith is a defense to section 1341. 55 The
circuit court remanded the case, holding that Curry would have
violated the statute if he had knowingly mailed false reports to the
56
state committee.
Judge Garwood, although concurring with the majority's decision to reverse the conviction, rejected its contention that if Curry had
knowingly mailed false reports, he would have "defrauded" the committee of its right to accurate information. 57 Judge Garwood also
criticized the States decision as giving "an excessively broad reading"

49 Id.

w Id. at 1249.
51 Id.
52 The court did not believe that anyone had been defrauded, noting that "the tips. . . were
clearly not kickbacks and the City of St. Louis. . . suffered no pecuniary detriment.
Id. at
1248.
53 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982).
-" Id. at 408.
-5 Id. at 416.
5o Id. at 416-17.
57 Id. at 420 (Garwood, J., concurring). Judge Garwood observed that: "no case has held
that the mere denial to the victim of accurate information ... is of itself sufficient to render the
knowingly [sic] making of a false statement a defrauding. There must be contemplated some
significant detriment to the victim, or benefit to the perpetrator, apart from the deception
itself." Id. (emphasis in original).
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to Fifth Circuit decisions cited therein58 to bolster the court's support
of States' conviction under the intangible rights theory.59 Significantly, Judge Garwood pointed out that prosecuting Curry under
section 1341 made a felony out of conduct which was at most a
misdemeanor under Louisiana law, punishable only by a fine.60 Each
count of mail fraud, however, exposes the defendant to five years in
prison plus a considerably larger fine, not to mention the brand of a
felon."1
Similarly, in New Jersey, a federal prosecution under section
1341 for allegedly fraudulent certifications of absentee ballots which
were delivered by mail to the county elections commission would
expose the defendant to a five year sentence for each ballot.6 2 Under
state law, this is a crime of the fourth degree,6 3 punishable by disenfranchisement 4 and a maximum sentence of eighteen months, 5 with
a presumption of a noncustodial sentence. 6 Although it is important
to safeguard the integrity of even minor elections, the punishment
should fit the crime. Federal mail fraud prosecutions do not deter
election fraud, they merely encourage the hand delivery of absentee
ballots.
Further, the government faces the risk of losing cases prosecuted
under section 1341 where the fraud clearly occurred but the mailings
did not. The United States Attorney's Office came close to losing its
case against Robert C. Botti, then-Mayor of Union City, New Jersey,
because the bids he was accused of rigging may have been hand
delivered. 6 7 Although the jury convicted Botti of mail fraud, the trial

" Fifth Circuit decisions cited by the States court included: Abbott v. United States, 239
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956); Steiner v. United States, 134 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
774 (1943); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
59 Curry, 681 F.2d at 418 n.1. Judge Garwood's opinion also traced the legislative history of
§ 1341, and concluded that the intangible rights theory of mail fraud prosecutions is in derogation of Congress' intent.
60 Id. at 421. The fine is not to exceed $500, plus 150% of the amount not reported to the
committee.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Each count exposes the defendant to a $1000 fine. Professor Schwartz
has noted that, because each use of the mail in a single scheme is a separate offense, a court may
sentence the defendant to as much as "five years multiplied by the number of different letters
which the prosecutor cares to make the subject of separate counts in the indictment." Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 79-80.
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-17 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
63 Id. § 19:57-37.
64 Id.
65 Id. § 2C:44-1(f) (West 1982).
" Id. § 2C:44-1(e).
Botti v. United States, No. 83-718 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3422 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1983).
67
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judge stated that he would have dismissed the mail fraud counts.6 8 If
Botti had been prosecuted in state court under the New Jersey law
requiring competitive bidding, 9 the manner in which the bids were
submitted would have been irrelevant.
III. THE HOBBS Ac-r
Another federal statute which has been acknowledged as a useful
tool for federal prosecution of certain state crimes, bribery and extortion in particular, is the Hobbs Act. 7 0 This statute was enacted by
Congress in 1945 to thwart "highway robbery" by members of the
Teamsters Union. 71 It amended the Anti-Racketeering Act of 193472
Judge Meanor, in denying Botti's motion for acquittal, nonetheless stated that "I myself, as
a factfinder, would have acquitted Mr. Botti [on the mail fraud counts]." The Dispatch, Jan. 25.,
1983, at 16, col. 3.
69 N.J. STAT ANN. § 40A:11-1 to -37 (West 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (local Public
Contracts Law). Theft by Deception, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-4 (West 1982), could also apply.
10 The Hobbs Act reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
08

(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatenedforce, violence, or fear,
or under color of official right.
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) (emphasis added). See Stern, Prosecutionsof Local Political
Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary DistinctionBetween Bribery and Extortion,
3 SzroN HALL L. REv. 1 (1971), for an approving view of such prosecutions. But see Comment,
Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 66 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306 (1975).

Judge Stern, a former federal prosecutor, stated that whether a political official was in
reality guilty of either passively accepting bribes or actively extorting payments, he may be
prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. This view was adopted by the Third Circuit. United States v.
Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); United States v. Jannotti, 673
F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). But see Judge Aldisert's dissent in United
States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 426 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980), wherein
he denounced the circuit's "revolutionary interpretation of the Hobbs Act" in Kenny, and urged
the panel to "cure our error by having the full court reexamine the Kenny rule .. " Id. at 42627 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit's Kenny decision "became the country's landmark
case interpreting extortion under the Hobbs Act .. ."Id. at 427 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The
decision resulted in the blurring of the distinction between extortion and bribery. The Third
Circuit's "failure to reexamine its rationale has resulted in a perpetuation of erroneous law not
only in this circuit but in the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits which
have followed our lead without setting forth a reasoned elaboration for their conclusions." Id.
(footnote omitted).
71 91 CONG. Rac. 11,841 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Cox of Georgia). Congressman Cox said:
"The sole purpose of the bill ... is to undo the outrageous opinion of the Supreme Court in the
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and, like that statute, prohibits extortion. 73 The Hobbs Act, however,
only proscribes extortion which affects or restrains interstate commerce. It is this limitation which distinguishes Hobbs Act violations
from the state crime of extortion, and which gave Congress authority
4
to enact the law.1
The Hobbs Act had its genesis in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the earlier Act, 75 which the Court held did not apply to
organized labor because its aim was the "elimination of terroristic
activities by professional gangsters. '76 The Court, in United States v.
Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters77 reversed the
convictions of twenty-six members of the New York City Teamsters
local who had exacted tributes78 from out-of-state, nonunionized
truck drivers who brought goods into the City. 79 The Court based its
decision on section two of the Act, 80 which it interpreted to exempt
union members. Reaction among many members of Congress was
vehement,8 1 and the Hobbs Act was proposed to "plug up [the] loopholes" 12 in the earlier law.
Some congressmen expressed concern that the new bill was unnecessary because all the states had laws against extortion, and the
83
Hobbs Act might be an impermissible preemption of these laws.
Teamsters Union case, where that Court legitimatized highway robbery when committed by a
labor goon." Id.
72 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 979 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1982)).
13 Extortion, as defined by the Hobbs Act, is "the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982).
11 United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942); see also 91 CoNG.
REc. 11,848 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Lane).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
76 United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 530 (1942).
11 Id. at 521.
78 The tribute was payment of one day's wages at union scale by the nonunion drivers to
union members, who sometimes assisted in off-loading the trucks, and sometimes did not. Id. at
526.
71 Id. at 525.
80 Id. at 527. The Court, quoting § 2(a) of the Anti-Racketeering Act, said it "excepts from
punishment any person who 'obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or
the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to
threat to use, force, violence, or coercion, .
a bona-fide employee.' " Id.
11 See 91 CONG. REc. 11,843-48 (1945)
62 Id. at 11,848 (remarks of Rep. Lane). "The act of 1934 was directed against gangsters, yet
the case brought before the Supreme Court in October 1941 (United States v. Local 807, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942)) involved a labor union. . . .H.R. 32 (the Hobbs Act)
was inspired by that decision. It seeks to plug up loopholes .. ."Id.
83 See, e.g., id. at 11,843 (remarks of Rep. Rooney); id. at 11,848 (remarks of Rep. Powell).
Congressman Powell stated: "Ample State laws and police are provided. Why then, gentlemen of
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Hobbs Act supporters reassured them that the bill was not an excursion into the province of the states, emphasizing the interstate aspects
of the facts in Teamsters. One congressman remarked:
[T]his proposal applies to interstate commerce only. The Congress
has no other jurisdiction .... Every State in the Union ...should
enforce its laws. However, if interstate commerce is being interferred [sic] with, and if the farmers and truckers, who take food
into New York from surrounding territory and States, must submit
to [threats and violence] then it seems clear that it is the obligation
of the Congress
to furnish national protection in these interstate
4
operations.
The House record clearly delineates the bill's intent: protection of
nonunionized farmers and truckers, and elimination of any loophole
through which labor unions could escape punishment if they used
violence or coercion against nonunion members on the highway.8 5
For the next several years, Hobbs Act prosecutions were in accord
with Congress' intent in passing the Act, in that they centered on
87
extortionate demands of labor officials.8 6 In United States v. Green,
for example, the defendants, a labor union and an official, were found
guilty under the Hobbs Act of extorting money from two employers by
88
forcing them to pay for the services of nonexistent union members.
The district court arrested the judgments of conviction, reasoning that
the defendants' activities did not constitute a crime under the Act, and
that entering the judgment would extend its jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits."9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
extortionate labor activity was precisely the type of conduct which
Congress had intended to proscribe by the Hobbs Act. 90
In later cases, however, Hobbs Act prosecutions moved away
from extortionate union activity wherein either the threatened work

the States' rights school, do we need Federal legislation?" Id. It is apparent from the record,
however, that most Hobbs Act opponents saw the bill as anti-labor. Id. at 11,843-48.
8
91 CONG. REc. 11,843 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Michener).
85 See Comment, supra note 70, at 310-11, for a detailed analysis of the legislative history of
the Act. The author concludes that Congress' intent was to discourage labor extortion and
obstruction of the movement of individuals across state lines for the purpose of marketing their
goods, two activities which have direct effects upon commerce. Id.
88 See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); United States v. Green, 350 U.S.
415 (1956); United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded in part,
cert. denied in part, 384 U.S. 100 (1966); see also cases cited in Comment, supra note 70, at 313
n. 60.
87 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
" Id. at 417.
89 Id. at 416.
90 Id. at 418-20.
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stoppages or the depletion of the victim-employer's assets would affect
interstate commerce. The Act was invoked in cases not involving labor
threats,9 ' and the effect on interstate commerce was presumed, no
matter how small the alleged extortion payment nor how attenuated
the nexus to interstate commerce.92 This type of Hobbs Act prosecution parallels the Mail Fraud Act prosecutions brought in cases like
States and Curry: both involve plumbing the depths of absurdity in
the attempt to find a federal nexus. For example, in United States v.
Pacente,9 3 a Chicago police officer was convicted of extortion under
section 1951 for taking a $200 bribe from a liquor store owner. The
store was located in Chicago, and the proprietor bought his liquor
from Chicago distributors who had purchased their merchandise from
persons at locations outside Illinois.9 4 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
district court's determination that the $200 bribe depleted the resources of the store owner, who bought from people who bought from
5
people outside the state, and thus affected interstate commerce.
It is not only the virtual presumption of the jurisdictional element
of the Hobbs Act which has broadened its reach. Courts also blur the
distinction between the separate crimes of extortion, 6 which the
91See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.) (defendant convicted under
Hobbs Act for robbery of hotel), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975); United States v. Staszcuk, 517
F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (Chicago alderman convicted under Hobbs Act for accepting $3,000 payment
to support municipal zoning change), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v.
Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant convicted under Hobbs Act for demanding
$250 monthly from restaurant owner for "protection"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); see
Comment, supra note 70, at 313.
12 United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.) (hotel robbery affects interstate commerce because many guests were from out-of-state), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975); United
States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (payment to alderman to support zoning change so
animal hospital could be built had sufficient potential to affect interstate commerce because,
although hospital was never built, if it had been, some furnishings would have come from out-ofstate), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971)
(monthly "protection" payments of $250 by New York hamburger drive-in restaurant owner
affects interstate commerce because meat purchased in New Jersey), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070
(1972); see also Comment, supra note 70, at 314. The author notes that many courts "simply
assumed the effect upon interstate commerce from the depletion of assets alone and not from the
projected result of the threat if carried out," and asserts that "the unarticulated probability or
potential for effect upon interstate commerce have [sic] become increasingly more speculative in
the recent decisions." Id. (citing United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 845 (1975); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1070 (1972)).
13 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
94 Id. at 550-51.
91 Id. at 551.
96 Extortion is "[t]he obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
525 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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Hobbs Act proscribes, and bribery, 7 which it does not address. This
permits prosecution under the Act whether the defendant has passively accepted a payment or actively threatened a victim for the
purpose of extortion.9 8 This was the case in United States v. Jannotti,9 9
one of the infamous ABSCAM prosecutions. Jannotti resulted from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) brief foray' 00 into the City of
Philadelphia, and provides an example of a Hobbs Act prosecution in
which (1) the effect on interstate commerce is so unrealistic as to be
ephemeral; and (2) the necessity of the element of coercion to prove
extortion is overlooked. Jannotti was a member of the City Council,
and his codefendant, Schwartz, was the Council's president. 0 1 The
FBI agents, posing as representatives of the now famous and nonexistent "Arab Sheik," told the defendants the "Sheik" was interested in
the defendants accepted
building a hotel in their city. 0 2 Eventually,
0 3
money from the "Sheik's" representatives.1
Putting aside the defendants' moral turpitude, the fact remains
that, whether or not Jannotti and Schwartz accepted money, the hotel
never would nor could have been built. It was for this reason that
District Court Judge John P. Fullam dismissed the substantive Hobbs
Act counts before trial, "reasoning that there was no possibility that

97 Bribery is "[t]he offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence
action as an official or in discharge of legal or public duty." Id. at 173.
" See supra note 70. This phenomenon, the allegedly unnecessary distinction between
bribery and extortion, insofar as Hobbs Act prosecutions are concerned, was premised by a
former United States Attorney. See Stern, supra note 70. It was adopted by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); see also
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 624 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United
States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 426 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). In Cerilli,
Judge Aldisert in dissent urged his colleagues to reconsider this interpretation because the
legislative history of the Hobbs Act, whose definition of extortion was based on the New York
Penal Code, requires the element of "fear, threat or duress." Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 435 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted that the elimination of this factor denies a Hobbs Act defendant
the defense that, if anything was received, it was at the instance of the donor, which is a
"logically and jurisprudentially sound" defense. Id. "Our tolerance of this prosecutorial legerdemain is an indulgence in jurisprudential anarchy at the expense of basic tenets of criminal lawthe presumption of innocence, the government's burden in all prosecutions, and the basic maxim
nullum crimen, nulla poena. " Id. at 436 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
0- 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
100"The ABSCAM show was to play only 10 days in Philadelphia. The operation had to move
to another location if fish were not caught." Id. at 617 n.20 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
101Id. at 580.
102 Id. at 580-88.
103 Id. at 589. This Comment will focus only on the legal reasoning behind the defendants'

convictions for conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act. Neither the entrapment issue, the merits of
ABSCAM itself, nor the defendants' moral fiber in accepting money which was not theirs are at
issue here.
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the bribe payments could actually have affected commerce."'' 0 4 A jury
05
found the defendants guilty of the conspiracy charges.1
Judge Fullam dismissed the verdict for lack of jurisdiction. He
rejected the government's position that because a federal conviction
could be premised on the defendants' perception that the acts they
conspired to do could have had an effect on interstate commerce, that
perception also was sufficient to grant federal jurisdiction.' 0 Federal
jurisdiction, the judge observed, "is not conferred by a defendant's
erroneous perceptions." It cannot be conferred by "purely hypotheti1 °7
cal potential impacts on commerce which could never occur.
Judge Fullam also noted that to permit the convictions to stand
"would represent a substantial stretching of the definition of extortion, and a corresponding expansion of federal jurisdiction in deroga08
tion of the criminal jurisdiction of state courts."'
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, asserting that federal jurisdiction existed because "the defendants agreed to do acts
which, had they been attainable, would have affected commerce."
The court found that this implicated "a sufficient federal interest."' 0 9
Judge Aldisert, writing in dissent, noted that the majority's reasoning
supports "a conclusion that belief by a listener can somehow convert a
speaker's fancy into fact . . .[But] [w]ithout a modicum, or at least a
scintilla . . . of 'some effect on commerce,' the door to the federal
courthouse simply cannot be opened."" 0
Judge Aldisert hit upon the fatal flaw in the majority's analysis,
and, indeed, the type of analysis used in many Hobbs Act conspiracy
cases:"' the confusion of jurisdictional and substantive law relating to
the effect on interstate commerce. While the substantive, or actual,
effect need not have occurred to successfully prosecute a conspiracy
whose end was to have the effect occur, there still must be a realistic
possibility that it could have occurred in order for the federal interest
to be triggered. " 2 He recognized the central problem which prompted
the thesis of this Comment: "Instead of proving the conclusion (pres-

104United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
lO Id. at 1183-84.
106Id. at 1184-85.
Id. at 1185.
108Id.
107

'0

Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 592.

110 Id. at 625 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
I
"1

See supra note 70.
Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 626 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:574

ence of jurisdiction), the [majority's] argument assumes it and then
3
.
argues substantive law ..
IV. THE "COPPER PLATTER" '1 14 AND MANUFACTURED JURISDICTION
Hobbs Act prosecutions such as Pacente and Jannotti and Mail
Fraud Act prosecutions such as States and Curry constitute an expansion of the limits of federal jurisdiction beyond any recognizable
federal interest. States and Curry demonstrate not only how such
prosecutions unnecessarily burden federal courts, but also how they
,prejudice defendants by exposing them to much stiffer penalties
merely because they were brought to federal rather than state courts.
Perhaps the most cogent reason supporting the extension of the Erie
Doctrine to certain federal criminal prosecutions, however, is illustrated by what one judge" 5 has termed the "Copper Platter Doctrine."
That is the phenomenon whereby state officers who have
seized evidence in violation of their state's standards, thereby precluding its use in state courts, turn over that evidence to federal officers for
17
use in federal prosecutions.
The Copper Platter Doctrine is a reversal of the "Silver Platter
Doctrine," which existed before the exclusionary rule 1 8 was made
applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio." 9 One year prior to Mapp,
in Elkins v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court abolished the Silver
Platter Doctrine, and no longer permitted federal agents, who had
seized evidence illegally and were barred by the rule from using it in a
federal prosecution, to turn it over "on a silver platter" to state

Id. (emphasis in original).
judge Donald Ziegler of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas gave the name "Copper
J4
Platter Doctrine" to the process whereby state law enforcement officers, precluded from using
evidence in state courts because it had been illegally seized when measured against the state's
standards, merely turn it over to federal officers for use in federal court. The "Copper Platter
Doctrine" is the reverse of the "Silver Platter Doctrine," abolished by the Supreme Court in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Ziegler, supra note 10.
"s Donald Ziegler, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pa.
11

16

See supra note 114.

The test of whether the evidence may be used in federal courts is whether the search meets
federal constitutional standards, regardless of whether the search was made by state or federal
officers. Compare, however, the standard for probable cause to arrest when it is made by state
officers but the defendant is prosecuted in federal court. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) (standard of probable cause to arrest determined by state law, provided it meets federal
standards, when arrest made by state officers).
"I The exclusionary rule, by which illegally seized evidence is barred from use at trial, was
mandated for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
.. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"7

120 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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593

prosecutors.' 21 Elkins specifically forbade federal use of evidence
seized illegally, according to federal standards, even though federal
agents obtained it legally by serving a warrant on the state agents who
had committed the illegal seizure. 22 The Elkins Court rested its decision to bar the evidence in federal court on the fact that the state court
had deemed the evidence to be illegally seized, observing: "To the
victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded
by a federal agent or by a state officer."'12 3 Further, Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, noted that federal admission of the evidence
"implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw from [cooperation with
state authorities] and at least tacitly [encourages] state officers in the
disregard of constitutionally protected freedom. "124 By eliminating
the Silver Platter Doctrine, thus making the fruits of a federally
unlawful search inadmissible in both federal and state courts, the
Elkins Court found that "there can be no inducement to subterfuge
and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional stan25
dards will be promoted and fostered.'
The Elkins Court, although particularly deferential to states
which were trying to protect their citizens' constitutional rights, 2
overlooked the loophole in its holding: evidence seized illegally according to state standards may still be admissible in federal court
because Elkins goes only to whether the search, if conducted by
federal officers, would violate the Federal Constitution. This lacuna
did not go unnoticed by dissenting Justice Frankfurter, who noted
that state law violations by law enforcement officers were not relevant
to the majority's rule. Thus, Justice Frankfurter continued, the Elkins
holding would have the result of "creat[ing] undesirable conflict with

121Interestingly, it was the state court in Elkins which determined that the evidence had been
seized illegally and dismissed the petitioner's indictment. The federal officials then obtained the
evidence by warrant and used it to convict Elkins in federal court. Id. at 207. But before Mapp,
states were not required to exclude illegally seized evidence, and not all of them did.
121Id. at 215.
123 Id. (footnote omitted).
1,4

Id. at 221-22.

125 Id. at 222.
120 Justice Stewart wrote:

The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless
conflict between state and federal courts. Yet when a federal court sitting in an
exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only
frustrates state policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappropriate and
ironic way. For by admitting the unlawfully seized evidence the federal court serves
to defeat the state's effort to assure obedience to the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 221.
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valid and praiseworthy state policies which attempt to protect individuals .... [C]omity plays no part at all, and the fruits of illegal law
enforcement may well be admitted in federal courts directly contrary
to state law, ' '1 27 because the police action is tested only by the minimum federal standards. Justice Frankfurter was prophetic in anticipating that the silver platter would be replaced with another utensil:
A state officer who disobeys [his state's laws] need only to turn his
evidence over to the federal prosecutor, who may freely utilize it
under [the Elkins decision] in disregard of the disciplinary policy of
the State's exclusionary rule. I cannot think why the federal courts
28
should thus encourage state illegalities.
This phenomenon, the "Copper Platter Doctrine," grows more
serious as state courts expand individual protections through their
interpretations of state constitutions. 29 One example 30 of this occurred in United States v. Scolnick,' 3 1 in which local police officers,
upon arresting the defendant as a burglary suspect, seized from him a
key to a safe deposit box. 32 Police obtained a warrant to search the
box, but did not comply with a state law requiring the box's lessee to
be notified of the impending search and to be given the opportunity to
contest it. "3 The police did not find the stolen jewels they sought, but
did find $100,000 in cash, which they reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS put a lien'on the box's contents and sealed
it, in effect seizing it.13 4 Scolnick contested the IRS's action in federal
court on the basis of the state's search, which the state had conceded
was illegal, but the Third Circuit upheld the search and the use of the
evidence because " '[t]he test is one of federal law.' ,,3 Judge Freedman, dissenting in Scolnick, stated that the fruits of an illegal state
search should not be admissible in federal court, just as the fruits of an
36
illegal federal search are forbidden as evidence in state courts.

I" Id. at 244-45 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I2
129 See Ziegler, supra note 10, at 251.
"'i Another is United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 770 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (evidence
suppressed in state court as fruits of illegal arrest admissible in federal courts).
13 392 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
32 Id. at 322.
113Id. at 325.
l14Id. at 321.
"I Id. at 325 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 224) (emphasis in original).
136Judge Freedman wrote:
I see no reason why the policy of the state. . . should not be respected, especially by
state officers, sworn to uphold the state's laws. To allow them to violate the statute
and produce to a federal prosecutor the information thus obtained for use in a
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Somewhat akin to the Copper Platter Doctrine, in that it attempts to create federal court jurisdiction-and the imposition of
federal law-in derogation of state authority, is the device known as
"manufactured jurisdiction." This "artificial federalization of purely
state crimes"' 37 occurs when federal officials induce or supply an act,
such as an interstate telephone call, solely to gain federal jurisdiction.
An egregious example of manufactured jurisdiction occurred in
United States v. Archer.1 38 In that case, the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York, during an investigation
into alleged corruption in the Queens, New York, District Attorney's
Office, set up a crime to see whether members of the local office could
be bribed to drop the charges.1 39 To gain jurisdiction, two federal
agents, following the orders of an Assistant United States Attorney,
went to a hotel in Newark, New Jersey, solely to have one of the
defendants engage in an interstate telephone call. 40 The defendants
subsequently were indicted and convicted in federal court under the
Travel Act,14 1 but the Second Circuit reversed the convictions and
ordered the indictment dismissed. 42 Judge Friendly, who authored
Archer, observed that the federal officers' conduct "needlessly injected
the Federal Government into a matter of state concern, ''43 and dismissed the case on the ground that the interstate element of a federal
44
offense cannot be manufactured by federal officers.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment argues in support of applying the laws of a state
in federal courts within that state, an application of the Erie Doctrine
to criminal law. If Erie were so applied, the rights a state confers

federal trial is to lend federal encouragement to the violation by state officers of the
laws which control their conduct.
Id. at 328 (Freedman, J., dissenting).
"I' United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1980), revd, 673 F.2d 578
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
1- 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
119Id. at 672.
140

Id. at 674.

14118 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982).

Archer, 486 F.2d at 672.
Id.
14 Id. at 682. The Supreme Court also eschews specious attempts to gain federal jurisdiction,
even when such attempts are less blatant than those in Archer. In Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808 (1971), for example, the Court observed that overexpansive interpretations of the
Travel Act could "alter sensitive federal-state relationships, . . . overextend limited federal police
resources, and might well produce situations in which .. .relatively minor state offenses [are
transformed) into federal felonies." Id. at 812.
142
143
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upon its citizens could not be denied them by the discretionary authority of federal prosecutors to bring what are essentially state cases in
federal courts. This idea may seem cumbersome, and perhaps even
bizarre, to some-a sacrifice of simplicity on the altar of "states'
rights." It is in fact, however, merely a recognition of what ought to
be axiomatic, but what many federal prosecutors have decided to
ignore: that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. This
somewhat radical approach is offered because past entreaties to save
federal courts for federal matters have been ignored.
An analysis of certain prosecutions under the Mail Fraud and
Hobbs Acts has shown that the purpose and plain meaning of the
statutes in many cases must be tortured beyond recognition in order to
find a nexus to federal law. Application of state criminal law in
federal courts is simpler, and certainly more intellectually honest,
than the mental acrobatics engaged in by federal prosecutors and
jurists as they search, for example, for effects on interstate commerce
to justify their prosecutions and decisions. It is also a recognition that
every individual in this country has two sources of rights and protections, emanating from dual sovereigns. The Elkins Court sought a
"healthy federalism" by requiring the federal government to respect a
state's efforts to uphold the Federal Constitution. But federalism's
health is equally jeopardized when the federal government, in effect,
may ignore state constitutions and statutes. The rights a state has
chosen to confer on its people, as well as the right of a state to
prosecute state crimes, are obliterated when the federal government is
permitted to misuse federal criminal laws by an expansive interpretation of their scope.
In the abstract, the legal reasoning often used to make a federal
statute reach a particular defendant may be seen as an interesting,
albeit cumbersome, mental exercise. The reality, however, is that
frequently, such "exercises" are engaged in at the expense of an individual's liberty. It is unsettling to realize that federal prosecutors'
power to turn minor state offenses into federal felonies gives them
broad discretion to determine the degree of punishment to be meted
out.
Federal prosecutors, because of their vast powers, should be
forced to demonstrate a substantial federal interest before spending
federal dollars to investigate and prosecute a crime. If this demonstration cannot be made, and it is determined that federal prosecutors are
usurping the authority of their state counterparts, the defendant
should not be the one to pay the price by facing less protective rules of
law and stiffer penalties.
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The choice for prosecutors pursuing criminal actions in a federal
forum should be clear: They must either demonstrate that the case
involves conduct related to a substantial federal interest, or face the
application of state law.
Camille Kenny

